Drugs and arms {#s1}
==============

Rio's drug traffickers are a territorial and openly armed paramilitary presence in most of the city's *favelas*. The drug factions comprise armed groups that submit *favela* communities to their political and economic interests by means of territorial and paramilitary domination (de Souza, [@r2]). In recent years they have become increasingly territorial, political and military in character. Armed confrontations between rival factions and with the police are commonplace. They have arsenals of modern weapons that would make any terrorist group or legitimate security force jealous. Drug-related violence and territorial disputes between rival factions is a major causal factor in the almost 140% increase in small-arms-related deaths within the municipality between 1979 and 2000.

There are many similarities between 'child soldiers' and Rio's estimated 5000 children and youths who work for the drug factions. Children are recruited for such work from 10 years of age, and they are armed in early adolescence. They are subject to orders and punishments; they are paid for their service; they are given a weapon; they are on call 24 hours per day; and their survival is on the basis of a kill-or-be-killed reality. However, there is no military solution to this problem. Demobilisation is not a policy that can be implemented in Rio as it can be for 'child soldiers' when a conflict is settled. Furthermore, despite their characterisation within the drug factions' hierarchy as *soldados*, if we categorise these children as 'soldiers' we may legitimise the already high levels of lethal state force used against them.

Children's growing role in drugs-related armed conflicts has been facilitated by increasing access to modern weapons that are light, small and easy to use. There are great numbers of such weapons in circulation. In 1998, 10 017 illegal firearms were seized by police in Rio de Janeiro State, compared with 844 in 1960. Worryingly, in recent years drug factions have gained access to much more powerful weapons, specifically designed for warfare. Children and adolescents are now found in possession of Kalashnikov AK-47s and Colt AR-15 automatic rifles. The consequence of access to combat-grade high-powered firearms was corroborated by the surgical team at the Souza Aguiar Hospital's emergency unit, one of whom commented recently:

> Previously we would see orifices caused by the bullet entering and leaving \[the body\], or only entering without leaving.... Today, you no longer see orifices, you see amputations, you see the destruction of tissue and you know that this comes from a high-velocity bullet, a rifle for example.... Today you see many deformities. You see bits of feet missing, or the injury that my colleague mentioned, the boy with his hand destroyed. You see a lot of this today.

> There are many similarities between 'child soldiers' and Rio's estimated 5000 children and youths who work for the drug factions. Children are recruited for such work from 10 years of age, and they are armed in early adolescence.

International comparisons {#s2}
=========================

It is sobering to compare the danger posed to minors by gunfire in Rio de Janeiro with that of conflicts that attract considerably more publicity. For example, in the long-standing dispute between Israel and Palestine over the occupied territories, 467 Israeli and Palestinian minors were killed between December 1987 and November 2001. During the same period, in the municipality of Rio de Janeiro alone, 3937 under-18-year-olds were killed by small-arms fire. Amnesty International's report *Killing the Future: Children in the Line of Fire* (2002) calls for the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child to take notice of the fact that more than 250 Palestinian and 72 Israeli children were killed as a result of the conflict in the occupied territories between September 2000 and August 2002, a 23-month period. Between February 2000 and December 2001 inclusive (also a 23-month period) a total of 612 under-18-year-olds were killed by small-arms fire in Rio de Janeiro. The worst year for 15- 17-year-olds was 1990, when there were 274 firearm-related deaths in this age group in the city, equivalent to 100.5 deaths per 100 000 population. In contrast, in 1979, when drug factions were in their infancy, firearm-related mortality rates for children in mid-adolescence stood at 24.6 per 100 000 population.

It is sometimes said there must be similarities between recruitment of the drug factions' youth workers and the equivalent recruitment of gang members in urban centres within the United States and elsewhere. However, a drug faction differs substantially from even the most organised 'gang' in its command structure, in its quasi-military discipline, in the levels of armed confrontations, the complete territorial domination, and the almost total power exercised over the local population. The children caught up in these inter-factional disputes are far from traditional notions of delinquency. While there are 'institutionalised' gangs within some inner cities of the United States, there is no evidence that child recruits to these gangs are given war-grade weapons and paid a salary to walk openly armed within their community on defensive patrol.

> Unless there is substantial investment in the social and material infrastructure of the *favelas*, and a policy that brings in the rule of law, future generations of children and adolescents will continue to become involved and subsequently die while working in Rio de Janeiro's drug trade.

Conclusions {#s3}
===========

Perhaps the biggest tragedy in Rio de Janeiro is the fact that so much of the problem is due to socio-economic marginalisation of the *favela* communities. My own research has found (Dowdney, [@r3], [@r4]) that many children and adolescents in the *favelas* see joining a drug faction as their best option, despite knowing that death is the most likely outcome of such a 'choice'. Unless there is substantial investment in the social and material infrastructure of the *favelas*, and a policy that brings in the rule of law, future generations of children and adolescents will continue to become involved and subsequently die while working in Rio de Janeiro's drug trade.

Furthermore, until we fully recognise the increasing role that younger children and adolescents are playing in armed groups around the world, and build a practical body of knowledge in order to design policy implementations to tackle this problem, children and youths will continue to die in alarming numbers in countries that are neither at war nor at peace.

> For more information on the COAV (Children and Youths in Organised Armed Violence) international research project, and for a daily updated news service relating specifically to children and armed violence, visit the COAV website at [www.coav.org.br](http://www.coav.org.br). A PDF version of *Children of the Drug Trade: A Case Study of Organised Armed Violence in Rio de Janeiro* (Dowdney, [@r4]) can also be downloaded from this site.
